Halsburys Law states administrative courts unlawful.

Halsburys Law states administrative courts unlawful.

Councils and The CSA may want read this:

The law is absolutely clear on this subject. There is NO authority for administrative courts in this country and no Act can be passed to legitimise them because of the constitutional restraints placed upon her Majesty at Her coronation. The collection of revenue by such means is extortion, and extortion has been found reprehensible since ancient times.

Separation of powers Today, in the year 2011, we find for example, that in the council tax regulations, the billing authority, the prosecuting authority and the enforcement authority are all vested in the same body. The same bodies even purport to issue their own legal documents, by tacit agreement with the Courts. In our system of Common Law, the rule of law demands that we have a separation of powers.

Today, the powers are not separated. The executive is not a distinct, free-standing leg of the tripod. The executive now emerges directly from within the elected Chamber of the legislature where previously it emanated directly from the Monarch. That leads to constitutional confusion—because the executive has seized and misuses Parliament’s democratic credentials for its own, destructive, purposes. Fortunately, we have something to which we can turn to preserve our ancient laws and freedoms. We have the Oath that Her Majesty The Queen took at her coronation by which she is solemnly bound and from which no one in England, Wales and Scotland has released her.

At Her Coronation the Queen swore to govern us, “according to [our] respective laws and customs”. Certainly, among our reputed “customs”, is precisely that invaluable and widely admired tripartite division of the powers. The judiciary is part and parcel of our customary system of internal sovereignty—“the Queen in Parliament”.

It is one of the three separate but symbiotic powers, and it is a capricious and self-serving contention that it should not have the power to preserve the authority of the legislature over the executive. It is a constitutional principle that the assent of the Queen & Parliament is prerequisite to the establishment of a Court which can operate a system of administrative law in Her Majesty’s Courts in England.

This was confirmed by Lord Denning during the debates on the European Communities Amendment Bill, HL Deb 08 October 1986 vol 480 cc246-95 246 at 250: “There is our judicial system deriving from the Crown as the source and fountain of justice. No court can be set up in England, no court can exist in England, except by the authority of the Queen and Parliament.

That has been so ever since the Bill of Rights.” 08 -10 – 1986 vol 480 cc246-95 246 at 250.

[15/12/2011 22:30:58] catherine.crossan1: Halsbury’s Laws of England/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (VOLUME 1(1) (2001 REISSUE))/1.  INTRODUCTION/(1)  SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE SUBJECT/1.  Scope.



1.  Scope.

For the purposes of this work, administrative law1 is understood to mean the law relating to the discharge of functions of a public nature in government and administration. It includes the law relating to functions of pub-lic authorities and officers and of tribunals, judicial review of the exercise of those functions, the civil liability and legal protection of those purporting to exercise them and aspects of the means whereby extra-judicial redress may be obtainable at the instance of persons aggrieved2.

1      For at least half a century after the publication of Dicey’s Law of the Constitution (1st Edn) (1885), the term ‘administra-tive law’ was identified with droit administratif, a separate body of rules relating to administrative authorities and officials, applied in special administrative courts. As thus defined, administrative law did not exist in England: see Dicey’s Law of the Constitution (10th Edn) 330. See also Re Grosvenor Hotel, London (No 2) [1965] Ch 1210 at 1261, [1964] 3 All ER 354 at 372, CA, per Salmon LJ; Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 at 72, [1963] 2 All ER 66 at 76, HL, per Lord Reid (‘We do not have a developed system of administrative law–perhaps because until fairly recently we did not need it’). Ridge v Baldwin supra, however, and a number of decisions which followed it, marked a significant change in judicial attitudes towards judicial control of administrative action. See Re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374 at 382, [1980] 2 All ER 634 at 638, HL, per Lord Diplock (‘[The case of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, [1969] 1 All ER 208, HL] is a legal landmark; it has made possible the rapid development in England of a rational and comprehensive system of administrative law on the foundation of the concept of ultra vires’); Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175 at 189, [1971] 1 All ER 1148 at 1153, CA, per Lord Denning MR (‘… there have been important developments in the last 22 years which have transformed the situation. It may truly now be said that we have a developed system of administrative law’); IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 at 641, [1981] 2 All ER 93 at 104, HL, per Lord Diplock (‘… [the] comprehensive system of administrative law [which] I regard as having been the greatest achievement of the English courts in my judicial lifetime’); O’Reilly v Mackman [1983]

2 AC 237 at 279, [1982] 3 All ER 1124 at 1129, HL, per Lord Diplock; Mahon v Air New Zealand Ltd [1984] AC 808 at 816, [1984] 3 All ER 201 at 207, PC (‘The extension of judicial control of the administrative process … over the last 30 years … has already gone a long way towards providing a system of administrative law as comprehensive in its content as the droit administratif of countries of the Civil Law, albeit differing in procedural approach, [and] it is a development [which] is still continuing. It has not yet become static either in New Zealand or in England’); R v Lancashire County Council, ex p Huddleston[1986] 2 All ER 941 at 945, 136 NLJ Rep 562, CA, per Sir John Donaldson MR (‘Notwithstanding that the courts have for centuries exercised a limited supervisory jurisdiction by means of the prerogative writs, the wider remedy of judicial review and the evolution of what is, in effect, a specialist administrative or public law court is a post-war development. This development has created a new relationship between the courts and those who derive their authority from the public law, one of partnership based on a common aim, namely the maintenance of the highest standards of public administration’).

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